Narrative, Self-Realization, and the Shape of a Life by Clark, Samuel John Allen
Please cite the official version forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
 1 
Narrative, Self-Realization, and 
the Shape of a Life 
Samuel Clark 
Introduction 
In this paper I argue against taking narrative as central to the ‘shape of a life’ 
phenomenon in value theory, partly by interpreting one exemplary life-narrative, 
Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of George Sherston. My aims are: first, to understand the 
evaluation of temporally-extended human lives as going well or badly. Second, to 
disambiguate one out of the various putative roles of autobiographical narrative in a 
cluster of problems about value, the self, and the interpretation of human lives over 
time. Third, by showing that narrative does not play that particular role, to advance 
by one step a general project of critique of the use of autobiographical narrative in that 
cluster of problems. I begin by introducing my central case. 
Sassoon 
Siegfried Sassoon was born in 1886 into materially comfortable but socially uneasy 
circumstances: his mother Theresa was from the artistic, socialist, but impeccably 
establishment Thornycroft family; his father Alfred was a younger son of the Jewish 
banking and trading dynasty founded in the early nineteenth century, in Baghdad, by 
Siegfried’s great-grandfather David Sassoon. Siegfried’s parents separated in 1890, 
and Alfred died of tuberculosis in 1895.  
Sassoon moved in aristocratic and artistic circles, but was always aware—and 
sometimes complicit in—their currents of anti-Semitism and of snobbery about people 
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who had made their money in trade. He was intrusively self-conscious, self-doubting, 
and partly alien, and he most admired people he saw as singleminded, 
straightforward, and fully at home. 
Sassoon is now remembered as one of the poets and autobiographers of the trenches—
alongside Wilfred Owen, Robert Graves, Isaac Rosenberg, Edmund Blunden, Edward 
Thomas1—who helped to define our default understanding of World War I: lions led 
by donkeys, mud and blood at the Somme, walking in disciplined ranks into machine-
gun fire, the absurd death of Edwardian England2. 
But—unlike Owen, Rosenberg, or Thomas—Sassoon had a long post-war life as a 
public figure, a poet, and an autobiographer. That last role is my interest here: I focus 
on Sassoon’s Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man (first published in 1928), Memoirs of an 
Infantry Officer (first published in 1930), and Sherston’s Progress (first published in 
1936). This slightly-fictionalized autobiographical trilogy is Sassoon’s definitive 
dramatization of a self-interpretation common to many soldiers: from innocence to 
experience via war’s baptism of fire. In Sassoon’s telling: from a pre-war idyll of private 
income, golf and village cricket, horse-riding in hunts and steeplechases, intense 
friendships with other young men, and privately-printed editions of his sentimental 
and old-fashioned verse; to the adventure, misery, comradeship, and loss of the 
trenches, his lightly-touched on heroism (he won a Military Cross), his equivocal 
revolt against the war, and the wide publication and recognition of realistic and 
satirical poems like ‘To Any Dead Officer’, ‘Survivors’, and ‘The General’: 
                                               
1 Kendall (2013) is one of many anthologies of the poetry. The autobiographies, apart 
from Sassoon’s, include Blunden (2000) and Graves (2000). 
2 Anyone who knows Blackadder Goes Forth knows this default. See further Fussell 
(2000), Winter (1995), and, for argument that this picture of the war is largely wrong, 
Sheffield (2001). 
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‘He’s a cheery old card,’ grunted Harry to Jack 
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack. 
* 
But he did for them both by his plan of attack.  
(Sassoon 1984: 69) 
And through that experience to a transformed adult selfhood which looks back on 
pre-war innocence as another life, lived by someone else. 
The Shape of a Life 
The question at stake in the shape of a life debate is: what is the relation between the 
goodness of moments or parts of a human life and the goodness of the whole temporally-
extended life from beginning to end? The goodness this asks about is specifically 
goodness for the person whose life it is: that particular value which is the object of self-
interested concern3. We can get an intuitive handle on it by asking what we want, or 
what we rationally should want, for those we care about—including ourselves 
(Feldman 2004, Darwall 2002). 
As David Velleman puts the question about the shape of a life, ‘is the good life just a 
string of good years?’ (Velleman 2000: 57). To see why we might think not, here is my 
version of a popular thought experiment. Consider two lives: Siegfried Sassoon’s life 
of innocence transformed into experience; and his counterpart Sassoon Siegfried’s life, 
                                               
3 This value is variously labelled well-being (Griffin 1986), welfare (Darwall 2002), 
prudential value (Tiberius 2015), quality of life (Nussbaum & Sen 1993), what makes 
someone’s life go best (Parfit 1986), what is good for a human being (Kraut 2007), or 
the good life (Carson 2000). I will use ‘good’, ‘goodness’, and ‘good life’, and talk of a 
life’s ‘going well’, ‘going best’, and ‘going better’ (for the person whose life it is), from 
now on. 
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which is a disordered ‘sprawl of incidents’ (Lessing 1995: 202), one damn thing after 
another, with no overall shape or organizing telos. Assume that these two lives 
instantiate the exact same set of momentary goods and bads: that the only difference 
between them is the temporal ordering of those moments (compare Brännmark 2001: 
226; Dorsey 2015: 304-5; O’Neill 2008: 1364, Slote 1983: 23-4, Velleman 2000: 58-9). This 
is an intuition pump for the thought that we should evaluate these lives differently as 
wholes, just because of their ‘shape’ over time. We might judge that Siegfried 
Sassoon’s life goes better overall than Sassoon Siegfried’s, but nothing I say here 
depends on that particular evaluation. The claim I need is only that lives can be other 
than equally good even though they contain all and only the same moments. I have no 
brief here to rank-order particular real or imaginary lives: my concern is the meta-
level problem of explaining the relevance of temporal shape. 
The conclusion we are supposed to draw from two lives is that overall goodness is not 
equal to the sum of momentary goods and bads. In evaluation of whole-life goodness, 
moments are not prior, either because the whole is prior and moments only have a 
value in that context5, or because they are distinct kinds of evaluation with no relation 
of priority either way6. 
Call views that temporal shape matters for evaluation in this way compositional views, 
and the value-property they pick out composition (I take the term from Brännmark 
                                               
4 I borrow my Siegfried Sassoon/Sassoon Siegfried conceit from O’Neill, whose 
version of two lives contrasts Orson Welles with Welles Orson. 
5 This is not exactly Alasdair MacIntyre’s view, since he is concerned with the priority 
over individual actions of the temporally-extended activities and practices of which 
they are part, not directly with momentary and whole-life goods (2007: chapter 15). But 
my version is at least MacIntyrean. 
6 This is David Velleman’s view. 
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2001). Compositional views of one kind or another are held by Alasdair MacIntyre 
(2007), David Velleman (2000), John O’Neill (2008), and Michael Slote (1983). Non-
compositional or anti-compositional views—sometimes called additive or summative or 
time-neutral views—are held by Fred Feldman (2004), Thomas Nagel (1979), John 
Rawls (1999), and Henry Sidgwick (1981). 
For my purposes here I am going to assume the truth of some compositional view and 
ask: given that temporal shape matters, why does it? What explains the putative fact that 
the shape of a life makes a difference to how well it goes for the person whose life it 
is? 
Narrative 
One popular answer to this question is narrative. Shape matters because how good a 
person’s life is depends in some way on its being a story and/or on what kind of story 
it is. Velleman, for example, says that: 
Intuitively speaking, the reason why well-being isn’t additive is that how a 
person is faring at a particular moment is a temporally local matter, whereas 
the welfare value of a period in his life depends on the global features of that 
period. More specifically, the value of an extended period depends on the 
overall order or structure of events—on what might be called their narrative or 
dramatic relations. (Velleman 2000: 58) 
Velleman then elaborates these relations as events ‘lending and borrowing different 
meanings in exchange with preceding events’ (Velleman 2000: 64). John O’Neill, 
similarly, moves directly from his version of two lives to an appeal to narrative: 
The life of Welles Orson goes better than that of Orson Welles. This is true even 
if all the good moments in the life of Orson Welles are equally as pleasurable 
as all the good moments in that of Welles Orson and all bad moments are 
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equally as bad so that the total hedonic value is identical. It does so in virtue of 
the narrative structure of the life. (O’Neill 2008: 136) 
This answer has its attractions: it is tempting to say that what makes the difference 
between my two lives is that Siegfried Sassoon’s life has a plot, a coherent and 
satisfying narrative arc held together by connections like causation, foreshadowing, 
and ironic contrast. Sassoon Siegfried’s life lacks that. The events in Siegfried 
Sassoon’s life make mutual sense of one another, where Sassoon Siegfried’s life is ‘a 
sort of Humean froth, a meaningless fluttering on the surface of life’ (Sacks 1986: 37).  
Despite these attractions, I think the narrative answer is a mistake. My plan against it 
is in three parts: first I define narrative, in order to make space, second, to display some 
possible non-narrative explanations of composition. Third, I argue against the 
narrative explanation and for an alternative explanation by self-realization. 
So, first: 
A narrative is a generic telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken 
by, and particular events which happen to, agents.7 
These various features need not appear together; many of them are not individually 
necessary for something’s being a narrative; and several sub-groups of them are 
sufficient for its being so. This is because narrative is a radial category (Lakoff 1987), 
with clear central or paradigmatic cases—George Eliot’s realist novel Middlemarch, 
                                               
7 My definition differs somewhat from the definitions given by Gregory Currie (2010) 
and by Peter Goldie (2012): Currie is more concerned than I am with the way in which 
narrative tellings represent their contents by manifesting their makers’ 
communicative intentions; Goldie focusses on the product of narration (a story) where 
I focus on the process (a telling). I do not believe that these are significant differences 
for my purposes. 
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Antony Beevor’s military history D-Day, Richard Holmes’s literary biography 
Shelley—and chains of similarity and extension, from one of their typical features or 
another, leading out to cases-by-association and ambiguous cases. Narrativity is 
therefore a matter of degree, not all-or-nothing, and different cases can be equally 
narrative in different ways. Or consider narratives of geological processes, or of the 
formation of the solar system, or of the first few microseconds after the big bang. 
So, for example, there are narratives which are not yet generic, because they help to 
found the genres in which they can later, anachronistically, be placed: consider 
Frankenstein’s relation to science fiction. Further out from the centre, there are perhaps 
agentless narratives. In film, consider Koyaanisqatsi or Fiorucci Made Me Hardcore, which 
merely tell a temporal sequence of visual and auditory events with relations of 
analogy, contrast, and repetition within a rhythmic structure, and which contain 
images of human beings, alongside other objects, without representing their agency.  
But there are limits to the extent of these chains: not everything is a narrative, because 
being a telling is a necessary condition of being one. There are no non-artefactual 
narratives. The existence of a narrative requires the narration of some content to which 
it refers, and which need not itself be a narrative. We can tell stories about stories—
consider One Thousand and One Nights—but not all stories are about stories. Some are 
about fox-hunting and fighting in the trenches. 
The flip-side of that point is that being a temporal sequence of particular actions and events 
is not sufficient for being a narrative. There are innumerable untold sequences—
consider ‘what happened at exactly the grid reference you are at now, in the 24 hours 
leading up to exactly 1,000 years ago’—which are presumably narratable, but which 
aren’t narratives until told. Many temporal sequences of actions and events are 
potential content for narratives, but not yet narratives. 
But how about being a telling of an unconnected temporal sequence of particular actions and 
events? For example: ‘at 2pm yesterday, a schoolgirl in Amsterdam accidentally left 
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her bag on the tram; at 230pm, the President convened a meeting of her national 
security advisors; at 3pm, a family of swans drifted lazily across Coniston Water…’. 
This is in a vague borderland, where is this a narrative? is perhaps an empty question, 
and we should just say that it has some of the features of paradigmatic narratives but 
not others. If we need a name for it, we could call it an annal (Carroll 2003). 
Moving inwards across that borderland, a telling of temporal sequence of particular agents’ 
actions and events connected such that some of them are explained—the schoolgirl forgot 
her bag because she was worried that when she got home, mum would be drunk 
again—is more narrative than my example annal. 
Getting closer to the centre, a telling of a temporal sequence of particular agents’ actions and 
events connected both by explanatory and by literary relations like analogy, echo, poetic justice, 
etc.—mum isn’t drunk this time, because she’s searching desperately for her own lost 
bag—is still more clearly narrative than my previous example. I suggested above that 
one of the attractions of the narrative explanation of composition was that some lives 
are held together by connections like ‘causation, foreshadowing, and ironic contrast’: 
we can now see that this list combines two different kinds of connection, the 
explanatory8 and the literary, and that they should be separated. 
                                               
8 I don’t mean to commit myself to the view that only causal connections could be 
explanatory. In particular, even if reasons are not just a variety of cause, agents’ 
reasons may explain their actions—the President convened a meeting of her national 
security advisors in order to discuss a crisis in the Middle East. But I can remain 
neutral on this question: all I need is the claim that the literary relations of an actual 
action or event do not explain its occurrence (although they may explain the teller of 
a narrative’s decision to represent those particular actions and events rather than 
others). 
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Back at the centre, a telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular agents’ actions 
and events which create expectations in its audience about what kinds of further actions and 
events will follow—mum’s lost bag contained money she was carrying for a local mob-
boss; the next scene is an exhausted detective taking one more call five minutes before 
she’s due to go off shift—has added a generic character (Currie 2004: chapter 3). 
With this account of narrative in hand, we can say that the most strongly narrative 
explanation of composition is that temporal shape matters because lives are (or can 
be) generic tellings of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, 
and particular events which happen to, agents—and especially the agent whose life 
we are talking about. Siegfried Sassoon’s life has a different overall goodness from 
Sassoon Siegfried’s because they are different stories (even though both stories consist 
in an ordering of the same moments), or perhaps because Sassoon Siegfried’s life fails 
to be a story at all. 
Non-narrative explanations of composition 
Narrative accounts of composition too frequently move directly from an argument 
that shape over time matters to the further claim that narrative explains why that shape 
matters, as if that were the only possible explanation, or even as if shape were 
equivalent to narrative. Having been specific about what a narrative is, and therefore 
what a narrative explanation for composition would need to be, we can now see both 
the space for at least four alternative possibilities, and the argumentative gap between 
shape and narrative explanations of that shape. I don’t mean to claim that the 
alternatives I canvass here are all of the possibilities, just that they are not narrative 
explanations, but could explain composition. 
First, a way of explaining away composition: taking pleasure. Fred Feldman argues that 
composition is just a special case of his attitudinal hedonist account of the good life. 
Attitudinal pleasure is the propositional attitude of taking pleasure in, enjoying, or being 
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pleased by some state of affairs, analogous to hoping for or fearing that state of affairs. It 
is distinct from sensory pleasure, which is just whatever sensations someone takes 
pleasure in (this neutralizes the standard anti-hedonist argument that there is no 
common phenomenology to our various sensory and other pleasures). Attitudinal 
hedonism is then the view that the good life is the life of attitudinal pleasure (Feldman 
2004: chapter 4). The shape of a life then makes a difference to how well that life goes 
only when the person whose life it is takes pleasure in that shape (Feldman 2004: 
chapter 6). If she doesn’t—if she is unaware of her life’s shape because she is caught 
up in the quotidian, for example—then that shape makes no difference to how well 
her life goes for her. It may of course please us, the people who do notice, but that is 
to our good not hers (and this is one of Feldman’s repeated moves: to argue that the 
appearance of non-hedonistic value is caused by our illegitimate projection of 
ourselves and our own attitudes into the thought experiment). The attitude of taking 
pleasure in is, like narrative telling, intentional—it is about something, it has 
directedness towards content to which it refers (Searle 1983)—but it is obviously not 
a narrative or a narration. 
Second, artefactual but non-narrative shape. For example, we can imagine a life with a 
musical shape, structured by non-causal relations like harmony, contrast, theme and 
recapitulation, tension and resolution, and balance (these terms will each have to be 
interpreted more or less metaphorically). A life so shaped could be a performance (if 
it was so shaped on purpose), but not a narrative, because music is not intentional: it 
isn’t about anything, it isn’t directed towards content to which it refers, and it is 
therefore not a telling9. 
                                               
9 More precisely: music can be about something, but need not be—compare the fourth 
movement of Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony, which is about a thunderstorm, with 
his Thirteenth String Quartet, which has no programmatic content. Or compare the 
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Third, time of life preference. This is Slote’s view against Rawls, Nagel, and others who 
claim that it is a demand of practical rationality that I maximise my good over my 
whole life without time-preference (Nagel 1979, Rawls 1999; see further Parfit 1986: part 
II). For example, it would be irrational to prefer a small good tomorrow to a larger 
good next year, bracketing uncertainty. Slote argues against this that it is practically 
rational to prefer goods occurring in the ‘prime of life’ over even much larger goods 
in childhood or old age (Slote 1983: chapter 1). This is an appeal to the culturally-
mediated biological structure over time of a life, not to a narrative of that life. We can 
tell stories about that structure, and frequently do; but that’s just an example of the 
point already made that many things are potential contents of narratives without 
themselves being narratives. 
Fourth, self-realization, which is my view and which I set out in a separate section, next. 
Self-realization 
On my self-realization view, temporal shape makes a difference because some shapes 
are self-realizations and others are failed self-realizations: they map the expression of 
potential woken and fed by lucky circumstance, or its thwarting. The temporal 
structure of a human life which governs how well it goes as a whole is analogous to 
the temporal structure of the life of a tree which governs how well it goes as a whole. 
For a tree: does it grow from acorn to sapling to spreading ancient oak? Does it wither 
for lack of water? Is it wired and pruned into a sad, twisted little bonsai? For a human 
being: does she flower into skilled, independent adulthood? Is she blighted by poverty 
or illness? Is she constrained and infantilized by a misogynistic culture? For Siegfried 
                                               
Stan Tracey Quartet’s Under Milk Wood, which is about Llareggub (or perhaps about 
Dylan Thomas’s poem) with Miles Davis’s In a Silent Way. I find it harder to think of 
similarly contrasting pieces of rock or pop music, which may suggest that these kinds 
of music are distinctively—although vaguely—intentional. 
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Sassoon: is he able to love without shame, or is he compelled by internal and external 
homophobia to hide and distort his sexuality? Can he reconcile his solitary inwardness 
with his delight in comradeship and action, or does he remain torn between them? 
How does his traumatic battlefield education transform him? Again, this possibility 
appeals to a narratable structure over time, but not to a narrative. 
More abstractly, the self-realization account of the good life is that your life goes well 
for you when, and in the ways that, your particular true self flourishes rather than 
being undeveloped or crushed or distorted. Equivalently, when, and in the ways that, 
your latent capacities—both those you have in common with other humans and those 
which are individual to you—are fully developed and expressed. Equivalently, when 
your life is a process of successful growth out of your individual potential into 
actuality. Your life goes badly for you when, and in the ways that, your common and 
individual capacities are crushed, distorted, or left fallow.  
This self-realization account has historical roots in German Romantics including 
Goethe and Herder; British Romantics including Wordsworth and Coleridge; and 
American transcendentalists including Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman (Lockridge 
1989); in Marx (as read by Elster 1989); in Nietzsche (1997, 2007); in Mill (as read by 
Clark 2010); and in post-Freudian psychologists including Jung, Maslow, and Fromm 
(Lockridge 1989: 120-121). In recent professional philosophy, Alan Gewirth (1998) and 
David Norton (1976) have each defended related accounts. Charles Taylor (1991) has 
discussed a contemporary ideal of individual self-fulfillment similar to self-
realization. But I am developing my own account, not committing myself to any 
master or tradition. 
The self-realization account is clearly similar to perfectionist accounts (Hurka 1993) on 
which you have a good life when you actualize your essential humanity; when you 
fully develop your latent human capacities and thereby live the life of a human being; 
when you fully engage in what humans do which makes them what they are. But self-
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realization is distinct from perfectionism: perfectionism says that the good life is the 
one in which you realize essential human potential; self-realization says that it is the 
one in which you realize individual potential, at least some of which will also be 
common potential in the sense that other individuals’ potentials are similar. That is, 
different human individuals will both share common human capacities and have their 
distinctive capacities which are less widely shared or not shared at all. Self-realization 
for one of us will therefore be in some ways like and in other ways unlike self-
realization for others, and the good life for me may be importantly different from the 
good life for you, or her, or him.10 
I have offered the first three alternative views canvassed above mostly to make the 
point that a specifically narrative explanation of composition is only one possibility 
among several, and that there is therefore an argumentative gap between acceptance 
of the shape of a life claim and acceptance of a narrative explanation of it. I now move 
on to argue for self-realization and against narrative. 
Agents, temporal sequences, and composition 
Siegfried’s Sassoon’s innocence to experience life-shape does compositional work to 
the extent that we evaluate the goodness of his whole life differently from how we 
evaluate the goodness of Sassoon Siegfried’s whole life. The question I am pursuing 
is: what explains that fact? In this and the following sections I argue for a self-realization 
answer to it by making use of my radial account of narrative. Once we pull the various 
conditions of narrativity apart and see how each might be involved in explaining 
composition, the attraction of a narrative explanation dissolves, and the attraction of 
a self-realization explanation becomes apparent, in different ways for different 
                                               
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for pointing out the need to make 
this distinction. 
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conditions. I conclude that we should therefore adopt a self-realization over a 
narrative account of composition. 
Recall, then, that a paradigmatic narrative is a generic telling of a connected temporal 
sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents. What 
exactly about narrative is supposed to do the compositional work? I shall go through 
its various features in reverse order. 
Is the compositional work done by the fact that narratives involve agents? No: even 
assuming that a connection can be found between agency and composition over time, 
this feature fails to distinguish between narrative and self-realization explanations. 
Loss of innocence is something that happens to an agent, Siegfried Sassoon, on either 
account. The appeal to agency therefore offers no support to a distinctively narrative 
explanation of composition. 
In that case, is the compositional work done by the fact that narratives are of connected 
temporal sequences of actions and events? It’s tempting immediately to reply ‘no’ again, 
for the same reason that self-realization equally involves such sequences, and that this 
feature therefore also fails to distinguish between narrative and self-realization 
explanations. But that reply is too quick. Paradigmatic narrative connects its temporal 
sequences not only by explanation, but by what I have called literary relations: 
analogy, echo, poetic justice, etc. Siegfried Sassoon’s life-narrative connects his 
careless courage as a rider pre-war with his suicidal courage in the trenches, not only 
as an explanation of the latter, but through Sassoon-as-narrator’s later ironic grasp of 
what his innocent pre-war self could not know. Perhaps, then, temporal sequences of 
actions and events connected by specifically literary relations do the compositional work? 
Velleman’s ‘lending and borrowing different meanings in exchange with preceding 
events’ (2000: 64) could be taken as a version of this possibility. 
The problem with that thought is that the literary relations are projected by the 
narrative’s telling, not already there in what the telling is a telling of. Sassoon’s irony 
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is a product of his narration of his story, not something there to be discovered in the 
content he tells us about. In general, literary relations are secondary qualities, in the 
relation between narrator and what’s narrated, not in what’s narrated alone. This 
possibility is therefore a disguised appeal to a different feature of narrative: telling. 
Telling and composition 
So is telling what’s important here? Is it that Sassoon tells his life-story as innocence to 
experience that does the compositional work? This is a more promising thought. 
Several accounts of the good life appeal to the subject’s own judgements or attitudes 
about her life11. Narrative telling of a life involves a relation to that life; autobiographical 
narrative telling involves a specifically reflexive relation; and perhaps that relation 
constitutes the life’s compositional good.  
I don’t think this appeal to telling works either, because it conflates two distinct roles 
which someone could take up with respect to a life: call them the storyteller and the 
judge. They are alike in being distanced, third-personal stances, even when reflexive. 
The attention of the autobiographer to her own life involves separation of self from 
self, turning her attention as subject on her temporally-extended life as object, in the 
same way as she might turn her attention on a life which is not hers (Pascal 1960, 
Goldie 2012). But these roles are importantly distinct: the storyteller gives an account 
of meaning; the judge gives an account of goodness, of how well the life goes. 
Meaning and good are distinct in three related ways. First, I can have a life which is 
meaningful and which goes badly for me. I can have a life which is meaningful because 
it goes badly for me: consider Robert Falcon Scott, or Anne Frank, or anyone whose 
                                               
11 I have already described Feldman’s attitudinal hedonism. We could add L. W. 
Sumner’s (1996) authentic life-satisfaction account and second-order desire accounts 
deriving from Harry Frankfurt (e.g. 2006). 
Please cite the official version forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
 16 
life stands as a horrible warning. These are highly meaningful lives exactly because 
they are disasters for those who live them. 
Second, meaning and good are relativized differently. The meaning of Siegfried 
Sassoon’s life is its meaning to someone who tells his story: Sassoon himself, his various 
biographers including Max Egremont (2004) and Jean Moorcroft Wilson (2013), the 
novelist Pat Barker in her Regeneration (1991), me in my section introducing him above, 
or others. But the good of Sassoon’s life is its good for Sassoon himself. Unlike meaning, 
it is necessarily relativized to the person whose life is good or not. If we talk of the 
good of Sassoon’s life for someone else—for Robert Graves, say—we are talking about 
instrumental good—Sassoon’s usefulness to Graves—not the prudential good we were 
looking for. 
Third, and as a result of its distinctive relativization, meaning can be multiple without 
contradiction, when relativized to different storytellers. There are many myths of Scott 
of the Antarctic, for example: 
In the post-war anomie of the 1920s, Apsley Cherry-Garrard published his 
memoir of the expedition, The Worst Journey in the World, as a lament for ‘an age 
in geological time, so many hundreds of years ago, when we were artistic 
Christians’ … The 1930s saw the expedition’s concern with natural history 
fashioned into something congruent with Tarka the Otter and rambling in 
shorts. The 1948 film Scott of the Antarctic, with John Mills as Scott, shaped it as 
a post-war fable of class integration, apt for the austerity era. The myth had a 
quiescent period in the 1950s and 1960s, when it held a secure if shrunken 
position as a perfectly typical subject for a Ladybird book for children. But it 
metamorphosed, rather than died, on the publication of Roland Huntford’s 
debunking biography Scott and Amundsen … Huntford denounced Scott from 
the New Right, as an example of the sclerotic official personality; the 
playwright Trevor Griffiths, adapting Huntford’s book as a TV drama, attacked 
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Scott from the Left as a representative of privilege and the Establishment bested 
by a rather democratic, workmanlike set of Scandinavians. (Spufford 1996: 4-5) 
Similarly, Sassoon’s life has meant different things to his various storytellers. 
Egremont takes Sassoon’s life to illuminate a particular relation to an imaginary 
country: ‘Sassoon evokes a lost, decent England achieved only in the imagination, 
perhaps only in the imaginations of those a little outside this county of the heart’ 
(Egremont 2004: 524). For Barker, Sassoon is one of various mirrors she holds up to 
the war and to British war culture. Sassoon himself at different times found different 
meanings in his own life. His later autobiographical trilogy The Old Century (1938), The 
Weald of Youth (1942), and Siegfried’s Journey (1945) give different significance to the 
same actions and events as the earlier Memoirs of George Sherston: Sassoon repudiates 
his 1917 protest against the conduct of that war in light of his support for war against 
Nazi Germany, for example.  
To be clear, I do not mean to claim that anything goes in meaning-finding, only that the 
standards which do apply—accuracy and sincerity, say (Williams 2002)—
underdetermine what meanings one can properly find in a life, and that this is not a 
problem for storytellers. Meaning is happily plural. 
The good, in contrast, cannot be multiple without contradiction, because the goodness 
of a life supervenes on the life: there are no pairs of possible worlds such that both 
contain Sassoons identical in every way except that one’s life goes badly and the 
other’s goes well (I don’t mean this claim to imply or require any heavy meta-ethical 
lifting). 
With those distinctions between meaning and good in place: telling does the 
storyteller’s meaning-finding or meaning-making work, not the judge’s good-
evaluative work, including the specific evaluation of compositional good over the 
whole life. Narrative telling therefore fails to explain composition, although it perhaps 
does explain meaning. 
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What about self-realization? My point in this section is that composition is not 
explained by telling, and is therefore a fortiori not explained by reflexive telling, by 
telling one’s own story. And I want to generalise that point: one’s whole-life good is 
not constituted by any reflexive relation to one’s life—not the relation of telling it nor, 
for example, the relations of enjoying it or endorsing it. Whatever it is that makes my 
life good or bad as a whole is in the life, not in any attitude or judgement or other 
relation I take to that life. Composition is a primary not a secondary quality of a life. 
If that’s right, the explanation of composition will have to appeal to some structure in 
the life, rather than one projected on to it or constructed in reaction to it. And the self-
realization explanation of composition does appeal to such a structure: the growth of 
the self over time. So, although this doesn’t show that self-realization is the uniquely 
correct explanation of composition—there may well be other candidate explanations 
which meet this condition that the structure must be in the life—it does show that self-
realization is a better explanation of composition than narrative. 
Genre and composition 
Finally, does genre explain composition12? Sassoon’s autobiography belongs to a 
recognizable genre, the martial disillusionment narrative: it is a preeminent example of 
a standard twentieth-century way of writing about war experience as the burning 
away of illusion by battlefield education, also adopted by Ernst Jünger (2003), Paul 
Fussell (1996)13, Philip Caputo (1996), and many others14. Perhaps it’s that generic 
shape which does the compositional work and makes Siegfried Sassoon’s life more 
than mere Humean froth. 
                                               
12 This is again a MacIntyrean view, if not exactly MacIntyre’s view. 
13 Fussell’s case is complicated by the fact that he was a brilliant interpreter of others’ 
war memoirs (Fussell 2000) before writing his own. 
14 See Yuval Harari (2005, 2008) on the history of this way of making sense of war. 
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Again, no: the best of the World War I martial disillusionment narratives, including 
Sassoon’s, are the successful bringing into genre of unprecedented and at first 
indescribable experience. They do this partly by using precedent form (Sassoon’s irony 
is derived from Thomas Hardy’s, for example), but they remake that form to be newly 
adequate to that new experience of industrialized mass warfare. The experience is 
prior to the making over into genre. 
The point generalizes: battlefield education is one kind of transformative experience. As 
L. A. Paul (2014, 2015) uses the term, a transformative experience is a life-event with 
two features. First, it is epistemically transformative. Living through a transformative 
experience provides a kind of knowledge only available by first-personal 
acquaintance. Only a parent knows what it’s like for her to have a child; only those 
who have fought know what combat is like for them (the claim is not that nothing can 
be known third-personally about these and other experiences, it’s that not everything 
can be known that way). Second, such an experience is personally transformative. I am 
a different person after becoming a parent; Sassoon is a different person after his 
baptism of fire.  
Paul’s argument is that the fact of transformative experience in human life is a 
problem for decision theory, because it makes rational expectation impossible. The 
person facing the decision whether to undergo such an experience—whether to have 
children, whether to become a soldier, whether to fight—cannot know in advance 
whether it will be good or bad for her, and therefore cannot make rational plans by 
trying to maximize the expected value (the probability of an outcome multiplied by 
its value) of her choices. 
I take a different but compatible point from the fact of transformative experience. 
Sassoon, like many other soldiers, came to understand his own life over time as 
marked by the transformative experience of combat. His state of innocence is divided 
from his state of experience by fighting in World War I. That transformative 
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experience is temporally and logically prior to generic narration and to the distinct 
kind of understanding that generic narration can provide. The experience of combat 
is an intrinsically first-personal occurrence in time, which one must be present to in 
order to have it at all. Reporting such experience in a narrative, in contrast, must be 
later and secondary. 
The priority of experience over generic narrative is shown partly by the fact that we 
can fail adequately to narrate such experience. It is a major artistic achievement when 
we succeed: compare Sassoon’s success with, for example, David Jones’s interesting 
failure in In Parenthesis (1937), which, as Paul Fussell argues, never escapes the 
precedent mythic forms Jones brings to his attempt to narrate his war experience 
(Fussell 2000: chapter 4). 
Battlefield education, as one of many kinds of transformative experience, is prior to 
the generic narration of that experience. And, I now add, transformative experience is 
one kind of self-realization: one way in which we grow is by transformation. As for 
telling in the previous section, the compositional work is done in the intrinsic structure 
of the life, not in something we relationally or reflexively do to it, or some stance we 
relationally or reflexively take up towards it. We may generically tell the stories of the 
transformative and other self-realizations which shape our lives, because they are 
more of the many potential contents for narratives. But we need not in order for that 
self-realization to happen. Self-realization is therefore, again, a better explanation of 
composition than is narrative genre.  
Self-realization and composition 
Summing up my argument: the narrative explanation for composition is that temporal 
shape matters because lives are (or can be) generic tellings of a connected temporal 
sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, 
agents—in particular the agent whose life we are evaluating. The self-realization 
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explanation is that temporal shape matters because some shapes are self-realizations: 
they map the expression of potential woken and fed by lucky circumstance (in 
Sassoon’s and other cases, that waking is jarring and the feeding traumatic). I have 
compared the two explanations by distinguishing the various features of the radial 
concept of narrative, and showing, for each, either that self-realization is just as good 
an account, or that we should prefer the self-realization account, of the composition it 
is supposed to explain. 
Both explanations can appeal to agents and to temporal sequences of causally connected 
actions and events. Narrative can further appeal to temporal sequences of actions and events 
connected by literary relations, but literary relations are projected by narrative telling, 
not in the actions and events themselves, so this is just a disguised appeal to telling. 
Telling cannot explain compositional value: the appearance that it might is based on a 
confusion between the storyteller’s finding of unproblematically plural meaning in a 
life, and the judge’s evaluation of its singular goodness for the person who lives it. 
Goodness is not relational in the way that telling and meaning-finding require, but is 
in the structure of the life, and self-realization matches that feature where narrative 
cannot. Finally, genre cannot explain composition either, because the shape of a life 
can involve transformative experience, which is necessarily prior to its generic narration. 
Self-realization again matches that feature where narrative cannot. 
I want to emphasize a point about self-realization which this comparison brings out: 
it is not relational, and therefore not, in particular, reflexive (it’s not a relation a person 
has to herself because it’s not a relation at all). Someone’s degree of self-realization is 
a first-order feature of her life, the degree to which it in fact develops and expresses 
her central potentials. And, since self-realization explains composition, this is also the 
conclusion we should draw about that kind of value: the shape of a life which matters 
for the goodness of a life considered as a whole is a first-order fact about that life over 
time, not anyone’s attitude to, or judgement about, or other relation to, that life. It is 
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therefore, at least in one sense of a multivalent pair of terms, an objective rather than a 
subjective matter. 
So, for Siegfried Sassoon: the innocence to experience shape of his life matters for how 
well that life went overall because it is the particular and partial way in which Sassoon 
realized his human and individual potential (assuming, as I have throughout, that 
Sassoon is right to understand his own life in this way). He could have stayed an 
innocent and an artistic failure, but the transformative experience of war enabled him 
to express at least part of his nature.  
Where does this leave Sassoon’s and others’ autobiographical narratives? They do not 
constitute the compositional value of these lives: that’s in the self-realizing structure of 
the life. But that may leave such narratives an important role in the discovery and 
understanding of composition: Sassoon’s telling of his own story may reveal to his 
readers—and to Sassoon himself—an important way in which his life went well for 
him, despite its hardships and failures. 
Conclusion 
I have argued between the particular and the general. After setting out the shape of a 
life problem and some possible answers to it, I argued for a self-realization over a 
narrative explanation of composition in the case of Siegfried Sassoon and of other 
martial disillusionment narratives. I claim that this conclusion generalizes, and that 
self-realization, not narrative, explains all cases of composition. 
Finally, by making that argument I have advanced, by one step, my most general aim: 
a project of critique of the use of autobiographical narrative in a cluster of problems 
about value, the self, and our understanding of human life over time. For all I’ve said 
here, there is still plenty that autobiography might do to address that cluster. It might 
be an important means of self-discovery and self-understanding. It might be involved 
in identity-making self-interpretation, in self-constitution into moral and legal 
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personhood, in learning virtue by remembering and planning, or in reconciling us to 
our own lives (respectively: Taylor 1989, Schechtman 1996, Goldie 2012, Rosati 2013). 
But I have excluded autobiographical narrative from one interesting role: if the 
temporal shape of a life makes a difference to how well it goes as a whole, it does not 
do so because that shape is a narrative. The shape of a life matters because some 
shapes are self-realizations.  
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